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ABSTRACT
In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and 
Epistemic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates a stance that not 
only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of 
democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of 
public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the 
following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the 
wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? I will attempt to 
explain why Prijić Samaržija’s stance can be understood as a version of 
deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by 
the public deliberation within this framework.
In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epis-
temic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates a stance that not only po-
litical, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. 
Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation 
on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What 
connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) 
justification of democracy? In the first part of the paper, I analyze the mean-
ing of the term democracy and introduce a distinction between procedural-
ist and instrumental justification of democracy. The second part of the paper 
introduces and discusses the distinction between proceduralist and epistemic 
justification of democracy. The third part explores the conception of deliber-
ative epistemic instrumentalism that, in my view, underlies the conception of 
the public deliberation procedure advocated by Prijić Samaržija. 
1.
Various types of justification have been furnished in connection with democra-
cy. The problem however is that they also pertain to various types of defining 
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democracy. Let us start with the basic definition of democracy as a collective 
decision-making procedure (Dahl 1989: 5): 
Democracy =df The procedure of binding collective decision-making.
Considering that democracy is conceived of procedurally, it is possible to 
further specify what is a democratic procedure. Brian Berry thus says that dem-
ocratic procedure is “a method of determining the content of laws (and other 
legally binding decisions) such that the preferences of citizens have some for-
mal connection with the outcome in which each counts equally” (Barry 1991: 
25). The discussions concerning justification of democracy mostly pertain to 
democracy as a procedure of collective decision-making treating all citizens 
equally (Christiano 2008). In connection with justification of democracy, two 
questions arise. The first question is whether democracy is justified in the sense 
that it should be preferred over non-democratic forms of decision-making.1 
The second question is whether justifiedness of democratic decision-making 
procedure is sufficient or justification of democracy also has to include pro-
cedure-independent values. Even if the first question is answered positively, 
there can still be a disagreement among those who conceive of democracy as 
a fair procedure enabling all to have an equal possibility of influence on the 
outcome of decision-making and those who conceive of this procedure as a 
means for arriving to good outcomes or the best results.
In the first case, we speak about proceduralist justification of democracy and 
in the second case, about instrumental justification of democracy. According 
to the instrumental conception, a fair procedure is not sufficient for justifica-
tion of democracy, instead, some procedure-independent standards are also 
required, on the basis of which outcomes can be assessed. This conception at-
taches decisive importance to consequences ensuing from the decision-mak-
ing procedure (Arneson 2003: 130). Thus even if the question whether dem-
ocratic decision-making procedure should be preferred over non-democratic 
decision-making is answered positively, the question remains whether justifi-
cation of democracy should be purely procedural or instrumental. 
The instrumental type of justification points to a broader conception of 
democracy according to which it is not only a procedure of collective deci-
sion-making, but also a set of institutions and practices that can be termed a 
democratic system. According to this type of justification, if additional insti-
tutions such as a constitutional court could contribute to correct the results of 
a collective decision-making procedure so as to make them more in keeping 
with the procedure-independent standards (fundamental rights and freedoms), 
then such institutions are also justified. A narrower understanding of democ-
racy as a collective problem-solving is also possible that does not necessari-
ly pertain to a specific formal procedure of collective decision-making or any 
specific institution. So, both institutional and non-institutional democratic 
1  In this paper, I shall not consider the first question and instead a positive answer is 
already assumed. For the arguments, see: Dahl 1989, Estlund 2008.
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problem-solving is possible. In any case, it is important to point out that justi-
fication of democracy usually pertains to democracy conceived as a procedure 
of collective decision-making. As such, it must be differentiated from justifica-
tion of a democratic system and justification of democratic problem-solving.
In order to see the differences between these conceptions, let us start with 
the democratic system. Within a democratic system, it can be justified that a 
greater role should be given to those who are more competent in order to en-
sure arriving to better outcomes (as in the case of decisions by a constitution-
al court when laws are overturned that do not abide by the constitution). This 
does not necessarily mean giving up on usual fair decision-making procedures 
that serve to enact laws in the parliament, but complementing them with oth-
er institutions in order to ensure better functioning of a democratic system.
However, conceiving of a democratic system in line with instrumental type 
of justification can go much further than that. Arneson even holds that if “se-
vere competency requirements”, should lead to best results, then giving up on 
equal voting rights should not be problematic (Arneson 2003: 130). The obvi-
ous problem with this more strongly instrumentalist stance, however, is that 
in this case, fair procedures are not at all necessary for a democratic system. 
Moreover, in this conception, a democratic system can be justified even if a 
fair decision-making procedure treating all citizens equally is fully rejected 
(Arneson 2003: 130). This, however, begs the question what makes such a sys-
tem democratic. 
In terms of problem-solving, it is usually also assumed that those who are 
more competent have a greater chance to contribute to best solutions. In this 
context, however, a question arises what makes democratic problem-solving 
justified? Aristotle held that multitude of people, combining their knowledge, 
can in some domains possess greater knowledge than experts (Aristotle 1998: 
83).2 However, democratic problem-solving does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility that experts should take part, as long as citizens are also included 
in the process.
In any case, it should be clear that justification of democracy is distinct 
from justification of a democratic system and justification of democratic prob-
lem-solving. Let us illustrate this point by taking into account a particular pro-
cedure of collective decision-making. Given that laws in representative democ-
racies are usually enacted by elected representatives, fair voting procedure is 
considered necessary for election of these representatives. Even if within a 
democratic system it can be justified that an institution should be able to cor-
rect laws enacted by representatives if they conflict with basic constitutional 
elements, it cannot be justified that any person or institution should decide 
in the name of citizens who elected representatives should be or that anyone 
should be treated unequally in that process. This is precisely what justification 
of democracy essentially refers to. On the other hand, justification of democ-
racy is also distinct from justification of democratic problem-solving. Namely, 
2  For reaffirmation of this stance in the contemporary context, see: Landemore 2012.
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the basic role of citizens in electing representatives can hardly be viewed as 
problem-solving. Even if democratic problem-solving is in some domains jus-
tified, it does not have the necessary connection with justification of democ-
racy conceived as a collective decision-making procedure. 
2.
Justification of democracy can be either proceduralist or epistemic. According 
to proceduralist conception, democracy is justified because it provides free and 
equal access to a collective decision-making procedure to all citizens. Propo-
nents of epistemic justification criticize this conception for not furnishing any 
criterion for differentiating correct from incorrect outcomes of democratic de-
cision-making. In any case, epistemic conception of democracy usually presup-
poses a procedure-independent standard of correctness for assessing outcomes 
(Cohen 1986: 34). A classical stance in this respect is epistemic instrumentalism. 
According to this view, a procedure of democratic decision-making is valuable 
because it leads to correct outcomes. It has usually been argued that majority 
voting is one such procedure. So classical epistemic instrumentalism presup-
poses not only that there is a procedure-independent standard, but also that 
majority voting is fully reliable procedure for the realization of that standard. 
Even though democracy is mostly associated with the majority rule, our 
starting definitions of democracy and democratic procedure include the pos-
sibility to specify it as a procedure of public deliberation or a combination of 
public deliberation and voting. More recently, a stance has gained ground that 
some kind of deliberative democracy is necessary for democratic legitimacy 
(Cohen 1997; Manin 1987). If citizens themselves have the possibility to dis-
cuss laws that affect them, then it seems that such a procedure is justified to a 
greater extent than the one in which they only have the right to vote. Obvious-
ly, the procedure of public deliberation in addition to free and equal access to 
a decision-making forum should also satisfy the reasonableness requirement, 
namely be based on the exchange of reasons for or against the proposal being 
debated (Cohen 1997). Even though it had initially been defended on proce-
dural grounds, deliberative democracy is increasingly becoming an epistemic 
conception (Martí 2006). According to an epistemic conception of deliberative 
democracy, if the exchange of reasons is to make sense, it must be assumed 
that some reasons are better than others, which again assumes that there is a 
procedure-independent standard of correctness (Estlund 1997: 179). 
But this does not mean that conception of epistemic instrumentalism is nec-
essary for an epistemic justification of public deliberation. Unlike the classical 
stance of epistemic instrumentalism, the framework of epistemic procedural-
ism can be more adequate both for epistemic justification of democracy and 
for epistemic justification of the public deliberation procedure. Namely, it is 
not necessary for epistemic justification of democracy that the procedure be 
fully reliable means for achieving procedure-independent values; what suffic-
es is that it should have a tendency to lead to correct outcomes (Estlund 2008: 
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8, 107). One of the consequences of epistemic proceduralism is that the public 
deliberation procedure (or a combination of the public deliberation procedure 
and voting) can be expected to have the tendency to lead to correct outcomes 
or at least avoid some very bad outcomes to a greater extent than alternative 
democratic procedures. 
What has been said so far could be summarized in the following way. First, 
justification of democracy refers to whether democracy - understood as a collec-
tive decision-making procedure - is justified to a greater extent than non-dem-
ocratic ways of decision-making. Even if we presume that it is, the question still 
remains whether for its justification intrinsic fairness of procedures themselves 
should be essentially important or it should only be important that they are 
means for achieving some procedure-independent values. The answers to the 
second question are usually differentiated into proceduralist and instrumental 
justification of democracy, which, of course, does not preclude the possibility 
of combining these two stances. We have seen that justification of democracy 
can also have an epistemic dimension, by holding that independent standards 
as well as procedures of democratic decision-making can have epistemic val-
ue. A classical type of justification in this regard is epistemic instrumentalism. 
Critics have rightly pointed out that epistemic instrumentalism is too epistem-
ic for the purpose of justifying democracy and its authority. Unlike epistemic 
instrumentalism, the stance of epistemic proceduralism does not require that 
correctness of outcomes is the necessary and sufficient condition for demo-
cratic legitimacy and authority of democracy (ibid: 98).  
Second, once we have answered the question what makes democracy i.e. a 
collective decision-making procedure justified in principle, it remains to answer 
the question which particular decision-making procedure is the most adequate 
in the normative sense. The view most commonly held was that the majority 
voting was the most adequate procedure both in purely proceduralist and in 
epistemic regard. However, this dominant view has been challenged recently 
and significance of the public deliberation procedure is being increasingly em-
phasized. As we have seen, the importance of public deliberation is defended 
both on proceduralist and epistemic grounds. 
3.
In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic 
Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija defends the view that can be termed deliber-
ative epistemic instrumentalism.3 In her view, justification of democracy must 
3  It is noteworthy that at one point in her book, Prijić Samaržija distances herself 
from the stance of epistemic instrumentalism (ibid: 152). However, given that she rejects 
both pure proceduralism and epistemic proceduralism and accepts the importance of 
procedure-independent epistemic values and that the procedure must be a fully reliable 
device for realization of these values, the only possibility left is to understand her stance 
as the one of epistemic instrumentalism or something near enough. 
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have an epistemic dimension. She maintains that in this regard it is necessary 
to take into account some procedure-independent epistemic values and epis-
temic significance of the decision-making procedure. However, in contrast to 
epistemic proceduralist view, but also in contrast to classical epistemic instru-
mentalism, Prijić Samaržija propounds a view that basic procedure-indepen-
dent value that has to be taken into account for epistemic justification of de-
mocracy is truth. On the other hand, in contrast to epistemic proceduralism, 
and in keeping with classical epistemic instrumentalism, she argues in favor 
of a view that procedures must be fully reliable means for arriving to truth. In 
her view, only one such stance can adequately account for epistemic dimension 
of justification of democracy, without reducing epistemic to political values. 
However, it should be pointed out that Prijić Samaržija defends her version 
of epistemic instrumentalism in the context of justification of certain type of 
deliberative democracy, that is, certain procedure of public deliberation. For 
that reason, I termed this conception deliberative epistemic instrumentalism. 
She claims that her “primary aim is to determine which forms of deliberative 
democracy and public debate optimally support the production of epistemi-
cally desirable decisions while being ethically/politically justified” (Prijić Sa-
maržija 2018:  101). We have seen that in the framework of justification of the 
public deliberation procedure, special significance is attached to purely proce-
dural values of freedom, equality and reasonableness. However, we have also 
seen that some procedure-independent standards of correctness were neces-
sary in order to make a difference between good and bad reasons. Prijić Sa-
maržija makes several proposals for justifying the type of public deliberation 
she advocates. First, the basic procedure-independent standard is truth (even 
though other standards such as correctness or problem-solving can also be tak-
en into account as epistemic values).4 Second, the balance between epistemic 
value of truth and political values of freedom and equality, is struck through 
the public deliberation procedure. Third, in order to achieve a proper balance 
of these values and to make the procedure of public deliberation a fully reli-
able means for arriving to truth, a division of labour must be made between 
experts and citizens. In short, citizens are the ones who should define goals, 
while experts should bring decisions about the best possible means for their 
realization (ibid: 112).
Considering that Prijić Samaržija defends such public deliberation procedure 
in the context of justification of democracy, the question arises which meaning 
of democracy she takes into account. If we revert to various types of justifica-
tion of democracy, we have discussed in the first part, it seems that her version 
of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism pertains to a specific procedure of 
public deliberation, and not a procedure of collective decision-making more 
generally. It seems to me that this type of the public deliberation procedure 
4  Prijić Samaržija says that “deliberative democracy, in order to be epistemically jus-
tified, must generate beliefs, judgments and decisions that are true, truth-sensitive or 
truth-conducive” (ibid: 18).
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can be considered either a part of instrumental epistemic justification of a 
democratic system or a type of justification of democratic problem-solving. 
Namely, the conception of a democratic system may hold the role of a joint 
decision-making of citizens and experts justified, so as to arrive to better re-
sults where expertise is necessary (Christiano 2012). It seems that the public 
deliberation procedure proposed by Prijić Samaržija is particularly relevant for 
more recent conceptions of deliberative democracy that align it with a mod-
el of a deliberative system, which take the democratic system in its entirety 
and seek solutions how to make it more deliberative and able to arrive at high 
quality decisions (Mansbridge et al. 2012).5
On the other hand, it is clear that the proposed public deliberation proce-
dure offers a kind of a mechanism for democratic problem-solving. One such 
procedure can have its significance in certain domains. For example, in the 
domain of environmental protection at a local level, it can be appropriate that 
citizens should identify the main problems and that experts should be con-
sulted in connection with the most appropriate means for solving such prob-
lems. Considering that it presupposes participation of citizens, one such deci-
sion-making mechanism can be a form of democratic problem-solving. In any 
case, as we have seen, justification of democratic problem-solving means that 
citizens should be included in the problem-solving process.6
Prijić Samaržija does not give a definite answer whether the public delib-
eration procedure she propounds should be viewed as a part of justification of 
a democratic system or as justification (or a part of justification) of democrat-
ic problem-solving. In some places, she refers to a democratic system. On the 
one hand, Prijić Samaržija claims that “this book aims solely to discuss epis-
temic properties of democracy as a social system” (Prijić Samaržija 2018:  42). 
In the same vein, she also stresses “the necessity of the epistemic justification 
of democracy, or the stance that the legitimacy of all institutions and systems 
– and particularly democracy as a comprehensive social configuration – must 
be based on adequate evidence that they, as social structures, maximally ca-
ter to the formation of high quality epistemic beliefs or decisions” (ibid:  100). 
On the other hand, she claims that “the general aim is to justify application of 
epistemology to real-life situations by exemplifying how such topics pertain to 
and directly contribute to improving societal epistemic processes” (ibid 2018: 
12). She thus emphasizes that the reason for inclusion of experts in public de-
liberation is to arrive to “the outcomes that resolve the problems of interest-
ed citizens” (ibid 2018: 161). The dilemma remains to what exactly the public 
deliberation procedure advocated by Prijić Samaržija pertains – whether it is 
a part of (epistemic) justification of a democratic system or justification (or a 
part of justification) of democratic problem-solving. 
5  For the role of experts within a deliberative system, see: Mansbridge et al. 2012: 
12–17.
6  For justification of an alternative version of democratic problem-solving through 
public deliberation that includes only citizens, see: Landemore 2012: 260–261.
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We have said that her public deliberation procedure can be viewed only as 
a part of justification of a democratic system. To see why, our starting assump-
tion is the following definition of a democratic system:
A political system is democratic if and only if it is a system in which citizens 
have equal political power. (Goldman 2015: 236)
Goldman emphasizes that within a democratic system, not all citizens nec-
essarily have equal political power in all domains. For example, representatives 
who enact laws have greater political power than other citizens, because in ad-
dition to the possibility to vote in elections like other citizens, they also have 
the possibility to vote for laws. However, Goldman maintains that this kind of 
unequal power does not pose a problem as long as in the fundamental sense 
a democratic system rests upon equal political power. He therefore says that 
democracy understood as a democratic system “requires such (approximate) 
equality only at the fundamental level. By ‘fundamental level’ I mean the level 
of elections in which political representatives are selected” (ibid 2015: 246). If 
Goldman’s stance is correct, then even a democratic system in its entirety re-
quires the existence of a basic collective decision-making procedure that treats 
all citizens as free equals. However, this implies that justification of a demo-
cratic system entails in the first step justification of democracy as a collective 
decision-making procedure treating all citizens as free and equal. 
Conclusion
I think that epistemic dimension is important for justification of democracy 
and that the stance of epistemic proceduralism is the most adequate theoretical 
framework in this regard. Furthermore, I indicated that epistemic procedural-
ism provides the most adequate normative framework for epistemic justifica-
tion of the public deliberation procedure (or a procedure consisting of public 
deliberation and voting) that treats all citizens as free and equal. However, in 
this paper I have not argued in favor of these stances, but have discussed an 
alternative proposal of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism defended by 
Prijić Samaržija in her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Polit-
ical and Epistemic Virtues. In this paper, I attempted to explain why her stance 
can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and 
to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework. 
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Ivan Mladenović
Deliberativni epistemički instrumentalizam,  
ili nešto što je blizu tome
Apstrakt
U svojoj knjizi Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snje-
žana Prijić Samaržija zastupa stanovište da su ne samo političke, već i epistemičke vrednosti 
nužne za opravdanje demokratije. Da budem precizniji, ona brani određenu vrstu javne de-
liberacije na epistemičkim osnovama. U ovom radu razmotriću pitanje kakva je veza ove vr-
ste javne deliberacije sa širim kontekstom (epistemičkog) opravdanja demokratije. U radu ću 
nastojati da objasnim zašto se stanovište koje zastupa Snježana Prijić Samaržija može razu-
meti kao verzija deliberativnog epistemičkog instrumentalizma, kao i koja je uloga procedure 
javne deliberacije u okviru te koncepcije.
Ključne reči: demokratija, procedura, epistemičke vrednosti, javna delibaracija, demokratski 
sistem
